Opposition parties failed to take advantage of ANC's inefficiencies

The question that arises from this election is not why the ANC did so poorly, but why the opposition parties, particularly the DA, proved unable to capitalise on the social and economic situation. 

There was a perfect storm of cards stacked against the ruling party. The ANC has reproduced the levels of inequality that typified the apartheid state, but without growing the economy.

The ANC has a reputation of being corrupt, crime remains a growing issue for all communities, the judicial system seems dysfunctional, there is record unemployment, living standards are declining, there is massive infrastructure failures, national debt is at a record high.  The list goes on.

Few opposition parties could be blessed with a better scenario to capitalise on. However, with the exception of the rise of uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) and Patriotic Alliance (PA), the main opposition parties have not found increased traction with voters. The largest opposition parties — the DA and EFF — have failed to significantly increase their vote share. 

Part of the reason lies with declining participation rates. Only 63% of the voting age population in SA registered to vote. Among those that did register, less than 60% voted.

In other words, less than 40% of the voting age population participated in this election. This, however, is an incomplete explanation. The question arises as to why a high proportion of voters did not register and why a substantial proportion of those registered did not vote. 

For this “blame” can only rest on the political parties who failed to send appropriate messages to potential supporters. The EFF, for example, has attempted to redefine itself and appeal to a much broader population. Their manifesto reflects more than 1,400 “promises”, and there is something in there to appeal to almost everyone. Despite this their support is declining.

Some part of this is due to the emergence of MK, which was able to attract a higher proportion of disaffected ANC supporters. However, MK can only account for the lack of traction with the EFF in primarily Zulu areas.

The performance of MK and PA shows that identity politics still plays a role in voting patterns. Despite their efforts, the DA has proven to be inept in portraying itself in a way that leverages voters' identity.

To understand the inability of the DA to take advantage of the perfect storm, it is necessary to review their election strategy. They, and several other parties, promise to rescue the country from the ruling ANC. Underpinning their campaign is the core message “put us in power and your area can also be run like the Western Cape”.

It seems that their expectation was that the message would resonate the more the failures were amplified. The more things deteriorate the more voters will look to them to save them. 

To amplify their prospects the DA has, when in opposition, taken an unconstructive position. As opposition in local government they do only enough to avoid criticism of being absent. 

DA councillors when in opposition will, for example, escalate your complaint but not solicit the solutions that would prevent the problem from arising again. Consequently, and outside the Western Cape, the DA fails to contribute to improved governance, greater transparency or the accountability of office bearers. Perhaps if they demonstrated they were part of solutions their messaging would gain traction and their support levels would rise. 

With a bit of luck the opposition parties will question why, when a prefect storm batters the ruling party, have they been unable to grow their support.